November 13, 2025 04:59 PM IST
First published on: Nov 13, 2025 at 04:59 PM IST
In our mindset to pin blame on Pakistan for every act of terrorism occurring within India’s borders, we tend to overlook our indigenous and latent terrorist modules, including the “white-collar groups” who have been active in the country since before Independence. I had drawn attention to this trend in 2009 during a lecture I gave at a three-day seminar on various aspects of terrorism organised by SIES College of Arts, Science and Commerce, University of Mumbai, for which our present National Security Advisor Ajit Doval had given the keynote address.
In the present case, it was the remarkable alertness, on October 19, of Srinagar Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Sundeep Chakravarthy of Jammu and Kashmir police that led our agencies to Maulvi Irfan Ahmad, the Shopian cleric, then to the terrorist modules across J&K, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh and finally to the Red Fort bombing of November 10.
Normally, none would have cared to go deep into the origins of such protest posters as they occur almost daily in J&K. However, Chakravarthy insisted on finding out who was behind the posters, and connected the dots. The CCTV cameras revealed the perpetrators, which led to the sleeper modules.
The importance of Chakravarty’s alertness cannot be understood without comparing it to our earlier experience with the Indian Mujahideen (IM) which had burst onto the scene two decades ago anonymously, playing havoc with our security and indulging in wanton killings on a pan-Indian model between October 2005 and January 2018
We could identify these killers only in November 2007 after synchronised bombing of three law courts (Varanasi, Lucknow and Faizabad) in Uttar Pradesh, killing 18 persons for which they claimed credit. Investigations later revealed that IM was responsible for 23 bomb blasts all over India, including the 2005 Delhi bombings.
A study of the Indian Mujahideen episode would indicate that they had exploited local and regional grievances, some of the resentments going back to the pre-Independence era, to enlist their recruits. In many cases, they had collected weapons and explosives without being prodded by Pakistan or by the pre-Sheikh Hasina Bangladesh.
In my paper presented to the 2009 conference, I had referred to a Malayalam book, Malabar Kalapam (Malabar Riots) by senior Congress leader, the late K Madhavan Nair, who had supported M K Gandhi, had gone to jail for Khilafat agitation, was a known friend of Muslims and was also an eyewitness to these incidents. This book was written in 1922 but could be published posthumously only in 1970. Another book, The Future of Indian Politics: A Contribution to the Understanding of Present-Day Problems, by Annie Besant, was published in 1922.
Nair had revealed that such religion-based attacks, mostly akin to modern-day terrorism, including suicide attacks, had happened in the Malabar area even between 1836 and 1853. This led to the constitution of a Commission of Enquiry under Thomas Lumisden Strange, then Malabar District Judge. The “Strange Commission” found that religious bigotry, rather than feelings against the landlord, was responsible for these riots. Preachers infused fanatical thoughts among the poor and less-educated Muslims who otherwise were leading normal lives in harmony with Hindus. However, the moment they felt their religion was “endangered” they resorted to violence, often using stealth tactics.
After the Strange Commission report was received, the British government exiled a local preacher of Yemanese origin Sayyid Fazal to Saudi Arabia in 1852. These feelings also led to several attacks, mostly terrorist, including the assassination of Malabar Collector Henry Valentine Conolly and his wife on September 12, 1855.
Yet another book I studied was The Moplah Rebellion and its Genesis by Conrad Wood in 1987. Here the author blames the British for discriminating against the Moplas and favouring Hindu landlords, thereby destroying the then prevailing social cohesion in Malabar by putting Hindus against Muslims who were from the poorer classes. This gave rise to religious bigotry among Muslims against Hindus as they were the favoured group.
Wood also says that the Strange Commission was asked to tailor his report bearing in mind that his “grand object” should be “to secure to the Nair and Brahmin population the most ample protection and safety possible against the effect of Moplah fanaticism.”
The moral of the story is that we cannot deal with indigenous terrorism unless we study the layers and layers of localised, age-old grievances and its impact on our 21st century society.
The writer is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, who was part of the High-Level Committee to enquire into the 26/11 terror attacks
