Earlier this month, the United States military launched an extraordinary attack on the Venezuelan capital of Caracas, before capturing President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.
It justified the act as targeting proponents of “narco-terrorism” and a president who was “illegitimately repressing the people of Venezuela.” That the country has the world’s largest oil reserves, which US President Donald Trump has claimed for American companies, is being seen as a key reason behind the US action.
Yet another motivation was the US attempting to reassert its influence in a region traditionally considered its backyard. Trump said, “I told China and I told Russia, ‘We get along with you very well, we like you very much, we don’t want you there, you’re not gonna be there.’” Over the past decade, China has gradually increased its economic and diplomatic engagement with South America.
But how might China be reading these events? Officially, the Chinese government condemned the US, and President Xi Jinping said recently, “All countries should respect other peoples’ independent choice of development paths and abide by international law and the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter – with major powers in particular setting the example.” However, some commentators on Chinese social media said that cues should be taken for their territorial claims on Taiwan, and China could similarly extract the President of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te, to gain control.
Haolan Wang, a New York-based Research Associate at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, answers some questions on the view from Beijing.
How do you see the argument that the US action in Venezuela will embolden China vis-à-vis Taiwan? Do such events matter for China in terms of justification for its own policies?
On Taiwan, I think it’s pretty clear that this has no tangible impact in terms of how China conducts its unification calculation for several reasons.
Story continues below this ad
Legally, China obviously doesn’t view the Taiwan issue as a matter covered under international law, particularly with regard to the question of “sovereignty” under the UN charter, as Beijing views Taiwan as a renegade province in an unfinished civil war.
And, even if International law were to apply here, Beijing has also been confident that the law is on its side. In the past, it has cited agreements like the Potsdam Declaration (1945) and the Cairo Declaration (1943), which affirmed China’s claims to territories occupied by Imperial Japan around World War 2 (including Taiwan).
Although it is important to note that at the time of their signing, neither the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) nor the Republic of China (ROC), which refers to Taiwan, existed in their current form. Then there is the fact that Taiwan is not internationally recognised as a “sovereign state”, unlike Venezuela.
So, an imperialistic America operating under the theory of sphere of influence has very little implication for Chinese calculations in Taiwan, which has always been about economic and political cost/benefit analysis.
Story continues below this ad
When it comes to other countries, however, it might have a significant impact down the line. China might logically conclude that it should pursue a sphere of influence in East Asia, at least by acting tough to shape states’ policies, such as Japan and the Philippines.
How Washington responds to Chinese pressure — like any sanctions on Japan or other Southeast Asian nations — will be an important signal. Is the US serious about exercising control over its backyard, or will it be like its usual self by saying one thing and doing another? Or, they could mean that the US will have Western Hemisphere dominance, but China shouldn’t dominate East Asia.
Additionally, the US action would prompt a major rethink/internal evaluation about the strategic and operational aspects of a potential Chinese military move.
Events in Venezuela are being compared to US military action in Iran in 2025. At that time, much was said about China’s deepening ties with Middle Eastern nations (similar to how South America-China ties are being highlighted now).
Story continues below this ad
Do you think that China’s partner countries in these regions expect it to play a more forceful role regarding their security? And would Venezuela-like cases result in these countries increasingly converging with the US, given its intention and ability to intervene?
On the Iranian comparison and the broader regional “ally” angle, I think it is worth exploring the different approach China has undertaken to wield its now immense global power, which is quite distinct from the America of today and the Soviet Union in the 20th Century, as China doesn’t have any treaty guarantee ally over the world (except North Korea). Maybe it’s a civilizational thing, where China sees itself as more of an inward-looking land power, or maybe it’s the old way of thinking still at work.
Another thought to contemplate is that China might not have been as close to Iran or Venezuela as the outside world has viewed it. Sure, China and Chinese business may have extensive business dealings and oil purchasing agreements with the two, but none are necessarily outside of the ordinary commercial relationship. I have been told that the Iranians never particularly trusted or wanted to rely on the Chinese (evident by many attempts to seek Indian purchase of oil/market access).
So, it’s probably a cautionary tale to most countries in the world — China can be your friend, but unless you are part of the core strategic interest of the Middle Kingdom, China is not going to protect you (unlike Uncle Sam).
Story continues below this ad
However, I doubt countries will significantly pull back from economic engagement with China, given the uncertainty of US policies and the global economy, it might not be a rational or even logical choice for many countries. Perhaps rhetorically and symbolically, there could be some changes, but presumably not on a substantial level.
