India’s muted response in the wake of yet another war in West Asia has stirred up the hornet’s nest. The behaviour of the Indian state isn’t new. It’s reflective of the pattern one has already seen during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Israel’s multiple aggressions in West Asia since 2021, the US’ tariff war against the world, and its operations in Venezuela.
Criticism has emerged from various corners, mainly centred around three themes. First, India’s response is not commensurate with its “projected” global image. The proponents argue that there is a massive mismatch between the image India projects of itself and the positions it takes on issues of global importance.
The second one, similar to the first but a more realistic strand, argues that India’s position isn’t even commensurate with its actual standing in the global order. They expect the world’s fourth-largest economy to be more assertive.
Lastly, there’s a constituency that believes that India’s responses are at odds with its ideological moorings and civilisational ethos. They make a case for ethics and morality to be reflected in India’s conduct of diplomacy.
Furthermore, the three groups often draw comparisons with the Nehruvian era to highlight instances when India often took positions against the major powers despite being relatively poor and far less powerful than it is today.
The central grievance remains that India’s choice to remain silent or neutral under the garb of strategic autonomy and balancing relations hardly yields any major concessions. For instance, concessions secured by India from Iran relating to the passage of tankers through the Strait of Hormuz are no different from those of Pakistan, Turkey, or Indonesia.
Many have already justified India’s position as prudent and pragmatic, guided by its interests, as none of the conflicts so far fundamentally affects India’s core interests — territorial integrity, sovereignty or governance. Of course, there are second-order effects relating to energy shock and inflation, but these have become rather customary in the troubled world we live in.
Nevertheless, there is more that explains India’s hands-off approach. To begin with, India’s silence is a function of its limited power and influence on the global stage. Because at the end of the day, a nation-state’s response to an event, in a world order where the organising principles are anarchy and self-help, is a function of its power or differential capability.
Neither can we absorb the cost of standing up to the aggressors, nor can we impose a cost on the aggressors for violating certain principles. The world hardly depends on India for anything significant that can disrupt its functioning. There are no global dependencies that India has created.
Further, one needs to recognise that India is still a developing country with a per capita income of US$ 2800. And the global trends towards protectionism, economic nationalism, increasing securitisation and weaponisation of trade, efforts towards de-risking, and frequent wars have already skyrocketed the cost of growth for developing countries. Going ahead, India won’t have the same conducive global environment that China had around the 2000s.
While the current dispensation cannot be faulted for not taking a stance, it did create false expectations by resorting to recurrent self-grandiosity.
India’s lack of leverage in the global order is further complicated by the fact that India’s most important strategic partners are messy operators, be it the US, Russia, Israel or Iran. All these actors have an affinity to operate beyond their borders, often with impunity.
In this light, what, then, should one expect from a country like India, which has a mountain of developmental challenges to scale and whose trajectory, like it or not, is intricately linked with countries that often happen to be irresponsible actors?
Definitely not take positions. Posturing will have costs. Huge costs. It is true that not weighing in on such issues will also have costs. But in all likelihood, the costs will be significantly lower than in picking sides. Thus, the most prudent way forward is to keep the head down, ensure that the cost of development remains as low as possible, and gradually work towards building influence.
The writer is a research analyst with Takshashila’s Indo-Pacific Studies Programme
